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SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES IN THE
INTERCHANGE OF ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS: STEPS TOWARD
DEVELOPING A SECURITY POLICY
by

PETER N. WEISS*

I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely expected that the impact of computerization on commerce will be as great as that of the industrial revolution.' Electronic
messaging techniques, particularly Electronic Data Interchange (EDI),
hold great promise to become the preferred methods of communicating
administrative and business information. But widespread use of these
techniques of electronic commerce will occur only if they have, and are
perceived to have, the same or similar level of security as paper-based
systems. The concept of security focuses on ensuring the integrity and
availability of communications and, to the extent necessary, guaranteeing confidentiality.
Electronic and paper media share many of the same security risks.
However, the security protections associated with the traditional use of
paper and signatures are so transparent to users and so customary that
little thought is given to whether particular transactions require their
use. Thus, statutory and regulatory provisions commonly specify that
communications be "in writing," "signed," "verified," or "acknowledged." These have become so ubiquitous that most routine paperbased communications, particularly forms, contain a facial requirement
for a signature-even in the absence of any specific legal or administrative directive that an original autograph signature actually be affixed.
* The views set forth are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those
of the Office of Management and Budget. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of
Thomas A. Connelly, a student at The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. His
help in the preparation of this article is greatly appreciated.
1. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM RULES OF CONDUCT FOR INTERCHANGE OF TRADE DATA BY TELETRANSMISSION [hereinafter UNCID RULES], ICC Pub.
No. 452 (1988).
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In electronic communications environments using techniques such
as EDI, however, these security characteristics are no longer "automatic," but must be designed into each particular application. The
Computer Security Act of 19872 provides a framework for determining
what security characteristics are appropriate for particular applications.
Although the Act only directly addresses Federal computer systems, its
principles should be generally accepted. The Act defines sensitive information as including "any information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized
access to or modification of which could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal programs, or the privacy [of] individuals... ."3 It requires each agency to consider the risk to such sensitive
information and to "establish a plan for the security and privacy of each
Federal computer system . . . that is commensurate with the risk and
magnitude of the harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized
'4
access to or modification of the information contained in such system."
As the Computer Security Act recognizes, the goal of information
security is to manage and minimize risk. The same information which
has monetary or other value requiring risk management also may be
called upon as evidence to prove the facts associated with particular
transactions. A paper purchase order or invoice may become evidence
in a contract dispute, and the information in a regulatory filing may be
required for enforcement proceedings. In the evidentiary context, the
focus is on whether the information is generated in the normal course
of business in a manner which maximizes the likelihood that it is reliable and trustworthy.5 Little consideration has been given, however, to
the particular mix of elements which will effectuate the goals of the
Act in the EDI context:
What is needed, then, is a security policy. Various techniques are
available to authenticate the source and verify the content of and to
control access to electronically transmitted documents. However,
there is little jurisprudential guidance as to whether and, if so, under
what circumstances these security techniques will provide the requisite

assurance of reliability. This lack of guidance concerning security
techniques is reflected in the multiplicity of current security and au6
thentication practices within the EDI community.
2.
3.
4.
5.

40 U.S.C. 759 (1987).
Id.
Id.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONICALLY FILED FEDERAL

RECORDS As EVIDENCE (1991) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEP'T GUIDELINES], reprinted in INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PLAN OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (1991); ASS'N FOR

INFOR. AND IMAGE MGlTr., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINE FOR THE LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF
RECORDS PRODUCED BY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYsTEMs, AIIM TR 31 (1992) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE GUIDELINE].

6. A.B.A. Res. 115 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1991). The resulting ABA resolution did
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EDI SECURITY
STEPS TOWARD DEVELOPING A SECURITY POLICY

The purpose of this paper is to present three preliminary steps toward the development of a security policy for the interchange of electronic documents. Its underlying thesis is that issues of legal
admissibility and computer security are intertwined and must be considered together.
First, this paper briefly reviews basic principles of the law of evidence in order to identify the characteristics of electronic records which
maximize the likelihood of their admissibility as evidence. This review
suggests that the characteristics associated with the evidentiary value of
electronic documents are essentially the same as those associated with
maintaining the security of the information. It concludes that the provision of adequate security under the risk-based standard of the Computer Security Act also serves to ensure that the electronic records may
be admissible as evidence.
Second, this paper analyzes the security characteristics associated
with traditional paper-based communications and compares the functions performed by each with the security services available in electronic data interchange and similar technologies. It demonstrates that
although the transition from paper-based communications to electronic
techniques poses some unique risks, the essential security requirements
are the same.
Finally, this paper presents a possible security classification scheme
for various EDI applications, and suggests presumptively adequate security techniques for each to serve as a starting point for the development of the security plans required by the Computer Security Act and
good practice. Each security plan must evaluate the risks associated
with the loss, misuse, or compromise of the information against the
costs associated with the various techniques available to mitigate those
risks. Its purpose is to identify those techniques which achieve a reasonable risk/cost balance under the circumstances.
not, however, articulate a substantive security policy, but rather encouraged its
development:
The [ABA] supports action by federal and state governments, international organizations, and private entities to: (a) facilitate and promote the orderly development of legal standards to support and encourage the use of information in
electronic form, including appropriate legal and professional education; (b) encourage the use of appropriate and properly implemented security techniques,
procedures and practices to assure authenticity and integrity of information in
electronic form; and (c) recognize that information in electronic form, where appropriate, may be considered to satisfy legal requirements regarding a writing or
signature to the same extent as information on paper or in other conventional
forms, when appropriate security techniques, practices and procedures have been
adopted.
A.B.A. Res. 115 (1992).
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Questions of legal admissibility and computer security are but two
sides of the same coin. For example, if a systems manager retained the
services of a component litigator to help design an EDI application in a
cost effective manner which would assure a high degree of likelihood
that the outputs of the system would be admissible, the system manager
would, in the process, have met the requirements of the Computer Security Act. On the other side, had the systems manager retained the
services of a security specialist versed in the risk/cost methodology of
the Computer Security Act to perform the same task, the outcome
should be precisely the reverse-a high degree of likelihood that the
outputs of the application would be admissible as evidence would be assured. Recognition of this essential unity between system integrity and
the evidentiary value of system outputs should help to alleviate unfounded, but often expressed, concerns regarding whether '7 electronic
documents and their various signature analogues are "legal."
III.

EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS FOR
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Although the law is sometimes criticized as slow to keep pace with
progress s the reality of the information revolution has been recognized
by the courts:
... [N]o court could fail to notice the extent to which business today
depends on computers for a myriad of functions. Perhaps the greatest
utility of a computer... is its ability to store large quantities of information which may be quickly retrieved on a selective basis. Assuming
that properly functioning computer equipment is used, once the relia7. Indeed, these concerns should by now have definitively been laid to rest. In general, signature and writing requirements are not legal barriers to electronic commerce:
The concern with electronic signatures... is a red herring. A variety of techniques for authenticating electronic documents exist that are as good or better
than traditional handwritten signatures... There is growing agreement... that
authentication and signature concerns can be addressed by existing legal concepts
in conjunction with adequate audit and record keeping controls.
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The ElectronicAgency and the TraditionalParadigmsof Administrative Law, 44 ArnMi. L. REv. 79 (1992) (emphasis added). See also, A.B.A. Res. 115,
supra note 6; SignatureRequirements under EDGAR, Decision of the SEC General Counsel, (Jan. 13, 1986) ("requirements for 'signatures,' . .. may be satisfied by means other
than manual writing on paper ... or the use of Personal Identification Numbers (PINs).
In fact, the electronic transmission of an individual's name may legally serve as that person's signature, provided it is transmitted with the present intention to authenticate.");
National Institute of Standards and Technology-Use of Electronic Data Interchange
Technology to Create Valid Obligations, 1991 WL 315248 (G.C.), 71 CoMP. GEN. 109 (1991)
(Contracts formed using EDI satisfy statutory writing and signature requirements so long
as technology used provides same degree of assurance and certainty as traditional "paper
and ink" methods of contract formation).
8. See Peter N. Weiss, Law and Technology: Can They Keep Abreast?, 8 GOV'T INFO.
Q. 377 (1991).
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bility and trustworthiness of the information put into the computer
has been established, the computer printouts should be recieved as evidence of the transactions covered by the input.9

As a general matter, 10 computerized records are admissible as evidence provided that they are authenticated and can withstand challenges regarding their genuineness and reliability. The authentication
requirement is satisfied "by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims."" This is done in
legal proceedings by laying a foundation that will qualify the evidence
as being what it is purported to be (e.g., a record prepared in the ordinary course of business).
Challenges to an offer of electronic documents as legal evidence
usually take the form of objections on the basis of a violation of the
"best evidence" or "hearsay" rules. A refresher on these rules might be
helpful at this point.
Originally, the best evidence rule allowed only an original writing
to be admitted into evidence for the purpose of proving the contents of
that writing; any copy or duplicate was excluded. 12 The requirement
proved to be unworkable and gradually the rigid application of the rule
was relaxed. 13 Today, the rule is considered a rule of preference rather
than exclusion,14 with the aim being to obtain the most reliable evidence concerning the contents of a writing or document when those
5
contents are in dispute.'
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) incorporate this modern
stance. First, FRE 1001(1) defines a "writing" to include any "mechani6
cal or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation."'1 Sec9. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1239 (6th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
10. For a more in-depth treatment of the subject of the admissibility of computerized
information, see generally Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Callfor
Authentication of Business Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U.L.
REV. 956 (1986); Richard M. Long, Comment, The Discovery and Use of Computerized Information: An Examination of CurrentApproaches, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 405 (1986); Mark A.
Johnson, Comment, Computer Printouts as Evidence: Stricter Foundation or Presumption of Reliability, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 439 (1992).
11. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
12. JUSTICE DEP'T GUIDELINES, supra note 5.
13. Id.
14. 2 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 237, at 76 n.2 (4th ed. 1992).
15. Id. § 243, at 87.
16. FED. R. EVID. 1001(1). The Advisory Committee notes to this rule make it clear
that electronic documents are to be considered writings:
Traditionally the rule requiring the original centered upon accumulations of data
and expressions affecting legal relations set forth in words and figures. This
meant that the rule was one essentially related to writings. Present day techniques have expanded methods of storing data, yet the essential form which the
information ultimately assumes for usable purposes is words and figures. Hence
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ond, FRE 1001(3) defines as an "original" writing "any printout or other
output readable by sight," if that printout accurately reflects data stored
in a computer or similar device.' 7 Third, FRE 1002 states that "[tlo
prove the content of a writing, recording or photograph, the original
writing, recording, or photograph is required... ,"18 This third requirement poses no great difficulty for admitting computer documents, including EDI documents, into evidence since such documents are by
definition original writings.
Of course, satisfying the best evidence standard does not make a
computer generated document automatically admissible. There is still
the hearsay hurdle to jump. A computer generated document offered to
prove the truth of its contents is hearsay,' 9 therefore, an exception to
the hearsay rule must exist to provide grounds for the admission of the
document into evidence. 20 This hurdle can be cleared with relative
21
ease.
While several possible hearsay exceptions may exist (depending
upon the circumstances) to provide a basis for the admission of a computer generated document into evidence, 22 the most commonly applicable basis is the business records exception. The business records
exception is founded on the premise that certain records are routinely
the considerations underlying the rule dictate its expansion to include computers,
photographic systems, and other modern developments.
Id. Advisory Committee's note.
17. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3). The advisory committee clarifies that "practicality and usage confer the status of original upon any computer printout." See id. Advisory Committee's note.
18. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
19. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." Id.
20. FED. R. EVID. 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority
or by Act of Congress." Id.
21. Recent court decisions have required a less stringent foundation for computer
records under the Federal Rules of Evidence than was previously required under the Federal Business Records Act. Compare United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982),
reh'g denied, 677 F.2d 113 (1982) (presumption of trustworthiness of computerized records
under Federal Rules of Evidence) with United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.),
cert denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977) (Federal Business Records Act requires a unique, detailed
foundation for computerized business records).
At least one commentator has recommended a return to greater foundational showings for computer generated records. Peritz, supra note 10.
22. For example, a computer record made by a party to the suit may be admissible
against that party as an admission by a party-opponent, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); or it may
be admitted as a past recorded recollection, FED. R. EVID. 803(5). Additionally, a computer record which is against the declarant's interest is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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kept and relied upon by a business to carry out its activities and practices. There presumably are built-in safeguards insuring the accuracy
and integrity of the information kept in those records. As a result, such
records are considered to be trustworthy and reliable, thereby making
them admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 23 the proponent of a computer generated record must show that the record is (1) kept pursuant
to a routine procedure designed to assure its accuracy, (2) created for
motives that tend to assure accuracy (e.g., not simply for the purposes
24
of litigation), and (3) not itself an accumulation of hearsay.
Electronically filed federal records are almost invariably offered as
business records prepared in the ordinary course of business.z5 During
the process of laying the foundation, the proponent of the evidence
seeks to demonstrate the authenticity and reliability of the information,
and the opponent tries to challenge those assertions:
[T]he foundation for admission of computerized records consists of
showing the input procedures used, the tests for accuracy and reliabil-

ity and the fact that an established business relies on the computerized
records in the ordinary course of carrying on its activities. The... op-

posing party then has the opportunity to cross-examine concerning
company practices with respect to the input and as to the accuracy of
23. The federal business records exception was codified in the Federal Business
Records Act prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1732(a) (West 1966 & Supp. 1993), repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-595, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2251.
24. United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Capital Marine
Supply, Inc. v. M/V Roland Thomas II, 719 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1983)); 12 FED. PROC., L.
ED. § 33:418 (Matthew J. Canavon et al. eds., 1988).
25. See JUSTICE DEP'T GUIDELINES, supra note 5 ("[ejlectronically filed Federal
records are invariably offered as business records prepared in the ordinary course of business."); see also United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[i]t is well-settled
that computer data compilations may constitute business records... and may be admitted
at trial if a proper foundation is established.").
The business records exception exists at common law or in statute in most states.
The exception also exists in federal law and is codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person
with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,
and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method of circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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the computer as a memory bank and retriever of information...
[The court must "be satisfied with all reasonable certainty that both
the machine and those who supply its information have performed
their functions with utmost accuracy."... Tihe trustworthiness of the
particular records should be ascertained before they are admitted and
the burden of presenting an adequate foundation for receiving the evidence should be on the parties seeking
to introduce it rather than upon
26
the party opposing its introduction.
Federal records management regulations also incorporate these evidentiary principles and provide similar guidance to federal agencies in
carrying out their responsibilities. 27
In sum, the law of evidence does not rest on inflexible paper-based
rules which should pose a barrier to the use of electronic commercial
practices. Rather, it is concerned with the underlying integrity of the
information on which a judge, jury, arbitrator, or mediator can reasonably rely in reaching a just conclusion to a particular controversy. Modern rules of evidence and court decisions appear to have come to terms
with the realities of business and professional practice-the ever-growing dependence on information technology systems for records production and maintenance. 2s
The essential questions posed by the law of evidence in this context can be summaried as follows:
Electronic messages present four distinct evidentiary problems:
1. Proving that an electronic communication actually came from the
party that it purports to come from;
2. Proving the content of the transaction, namely, the communications that actually occurred between the parties during the contract
formation process;
3. Reducing the possibility of deliberate alteration of the contents of
the electronic record of the transactions;
4. Reducing the possibility of inadvertent
alteration of the contents of
29
the electronic record of the transactions.
The key evidentiary issue is the weight that a court will give to
electronic records. "This will primarily be a question of agreeing to,
and implementing, adequate security procedures. '30 These concerns
with the identification of the originator, with the integrity of the con26. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1241 (6th Cir. 1973) (quoting United States
v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1969)).
27. Judicial Use of Electronic Records, at para. 11, Federal Information Management
Regulation (FIRMR) Bulletin B-1, ElectronicRecords Management, 36 C.F.R. § 1234.24.
28. PERFORMANCE GUIDELINE, supra note 5, at § 2.4.
29. MICHAEL S. BAUM & HENRY H. PERRrrT, JR., ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING, PUBLISHING AND EDI LAw, § 6.23, at 344 (1991).

30. Ian Walden, EDI and the Law, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & THE LAW 239, 241
(2d ed. 1990).
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tent of the communication, and with reducing the likelihood of alteration, which are at the heart of the law of evidence, are precisely the
concerns which must be addressed in the context of EDI security. Thus,
any combination of security controls which provides assurance that
these characteristics have not been compromised will also provide a
high degree of confidence that the contents of the communications will
be admissible as evidence. The following sections of this paper will examine the security characteristics associated with both paper and electronic media, and will suggest a security classification scheme which
may be of assistance in determining the appropriate mix of security
techniques for particular EDI applications.
IV.

SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS OF PAPER-BASED
COMMUNICATIONS

Traditional paper-based communications accompanied by handwritten signatures provide three essential security characteristics: message
integrity, originatorauthentication, and non-repudiation. Depending
on the nature of the communication, an additional security characteristic, conftdentiality, may be desired. The efficacy of the various techniques used to ensure the desired level of security in turn depends on
the adequacy of the administrativecontrols associated with their use.
* Message integrity is the assurance that the content of a communication is complete and has not been changed prior to receipt. This is
accomplished by a number of features, the primary ones being those associated with the use of the writing itself: inks which make erasure and
alteration easily perceptible, salutations and closings which constrain
the length of the message, and even the size of the paper which may
limit the addition of text. For applications requiring additional security,
techniques such as the use of engraved backgrounds, chemically treated
papers, or lamination in plastic are used to make alteration particularly
difficult.
* Originatorauthentication provides assurance that the communication originated from the named source. This is most commonly provided by the handwritten signature, or historically, by the seal of the
author. The authentication purpose of the signature or the seal has two
conceptual parts. First, they add a degree of formality, increasing the
likelihood of actual assent to the terms contained in the document. Second, they serve to identify the document with the originator, because
signatures and seals tend to be unique. In most commercial transactions
today, these functions are served primarily by the use of letterhead or
pre-printed forms, and in formal documents of a routine nature such as
checks and negotiable instruments, printed signatures or "autopens" are
often used to fulfill legal and customary requirements for signatures.
Higher levels of originator authentication can be provided by the use of
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watermarked or other special paper such as those generally used for negotiable instruments.
* Non-repudiation is a stronger form of authentication which relates to the ability of a disinterested third party to reasonably conclude
that the identified originator intended to be bound by the substance of
the communication. This function is most commonly performed by the
original autograph signature affixed to a document having facially adequate message integrity. During the early development of contract law,
primary reliance was placed on the individual's seal as indicating an intent to be bound. Only in the 20th Century did the signature gain its
present prominence, and the special status accorded contracts under
seal only disappeared as states enacted the Uniform Commercial Code.
Enhanced forms of non-repudiation have generally involved the use of
witnesses. Even after the use of written records of business and other
transactions became common in the later Middle Ages, the most important enhanced form of non-repudiation remained witnesses. This formal reliance on witnesses is carried over today in the attestation of wills
and the use of notaries public.
* Conf dentiality is the ability to limit access to the information
contained in a communication. This has generally been accomplished
with some combination of security markings, envelopes, seals, trusted
messengers, and by the use of codes and ciphers.
Administrative controls utilized adequately are central to the efficacy of message security. As paper-based communications took on
forms more diverse than the handwritten document with affixed signature, communicating entities had to establish internal procedures to assure the efficacy of the various security techniques they wished to
utilize. These ranged from limiting access to the official seal, and later
to the letterhead and autopen, to ensuring the trustworthiness of
message carriers and witnesses31
As explained below, these same security characteristics and procedures are associated with electronic communications, particularly EDI.
The primary difference is that the ubiquity of these techniques in paper-based systems and their transparency to users results in their being
given little attention. It is generally only when cost becomes a relevant
factor (e.g., the costs associated with special papers, autopens, or bonded
couriers) that attention is given to the risk/cost equation. In EDI systems however, no intrinsic security "baseline" analogous to the forensic
characteristics provided by paper, ink and signatures exists. Rather,
each technique as applied to any particular application carries a price.
31. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REVISED "INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS,"
OMB Circular A-123, 48 F.R. 38560-02 (1983) sets forth the present requirements for administrative controls in federal agencies.

EDI SECURITY

19931
V.

SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRONIC
DATA INTERCHANGE

"[E]ach time a new system or tool is produced, our more or less conscious attachment to tradition leads us to expect guarantees which
were32previously not only never fulfilled but were not even asked
for."
The use of electronic commerce techniques does not necessarily increase transactional risk beyond that experienced in a paper-based environment, but in some ways can actually reduce the likelihood of legal
disputes ever arising. This is in spite of the fact that, unlike paperbased communications, electronic communications can theoretically be
changed without a trace. For example, relevant communications protocols (e.g., X.25 and X.400) and the EDI standards themselves contain
headers, password fields, and control information relevant to security
and admissibility concerns. These characteristics, coupled with the
speed of communication afforded by EDI and the decreased likelihood
of transcription errors, may well lessen the frequency of disputes
caused by the transmission of erroneous information. It is significnt to
note that with electronic contracting starting to come into its own, there
is as yet no reported case of disputes turning on the authenicity of the
underlying electronic communication.
A common sense corollary to the risk-based standard set forth in
the Computer Security Act is that, except where the use of computers
increases risk, the use of computers should not create new requirements for the conduct of business beyond those that exist in a paper environment, unless the additional security obtained from those measures
is worth the additional cost. 33 Looked at from the standpoint of potential threats, "[s]uch controls should make the cost of obtaining data
34
greater than the potential value of obtaining or modifying the data."
Security characteristics of paper-based media (hand or typewritten
signatures and letterhead) are relatively easy to defraud, yet we use
them unless the particular transaction is of such value that the cost of
additional precautions seems justified. Certain electronic techniques
can provide security beyond that available in a paper environment, and
should be used when they will cost-effectively control new or previously
uncontrollable risks. The point is that security is not an absolute, but
must be tailored to the particular circumstances in order to be "com32. Walden, supra note 30 (quoting A.A. Martino).
33. Bruce W. McConnell, Electronic Data Interchange in the US. Government: An
Active Ingredient of Electronic Commerce, 1 EDI FORUM 17 (1991), reprintedfrom OFF.
OF INFO. & REG. AFF., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRES., A FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR MEETING THE
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL GovERNMENT (1990).
34. INT'L ORGANIZATION OF STANDARDS 7498, Addendum 2.
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mercially reasonable." 35
As in a paper-based system, the use of appropriate administrative
controls is essential to assuring security in EDI applications. These include organizational arrangements such as separation of duties, physical
security, and techniques for message authorization. Adequate administrative controls are central to the ability to effectively make use of the
various techniques available to ensure the requisite level of security in
the particular EDI application. In an electronic commerce environment, administrative controls also must be agreed upon and followed by
trading partners. The International Chamber of Commerce's UNCID
rules set forth a code of conduct under which trading partners may
agree on such factors as appropriate identifiers, acknowledgments of
transactions, confirmation of contents, protection of sensitive data, and
data storage and transaction logging. 36
The following is a description of the various computer security
techniques applicable to EDI, followed by an indication of which of the
four security characteristics they tend to satisfy. They are listed in a
generally ascending order of security strength.3 7 However, the strength
of each technique depends on how it is integrated into the system and
the accompanying administrative controls.
* Access controls. The use of logon techniques including passwords,
key cards or other tokens, remote job entry protocols, or other unique
identifiers such as fingerprint configuration or other biometric characteristics, which identify users and restrict access to an EDI application.
(Originatorauthentication,non-repudiation,confidentiality)
* Imbedded references. The use of agreed reference numbers of pass-

words, either generic to the parties or specific to particular transactions, within a message. (Originatorauthentication,non-repudiation)
0 Functional acknowledgment. A requirement for a confirmation

message to be returned each time a message is received, but which
does not repeat back the contents of the message. Analogous to a postal return receipt. (Originatorauthentication, non-repudiation)
* Message repetitionacknowledgment. A requirement for a confirma-

tion message to include the full contents or critical elements of the
message sent. (Message integrity, originator authentication, nonrepudiation)
* Internal message verification. Recalculation and verification of real

totals and/or hash totals to protect against altered values of essential
fields of a message. Hash totals are summations for checking contents
35. See U.C.C. § 4A.

36. UNCID

RULES, supra note 1.
37. For an additional discussion of each computer security technique, see COMPUTER
SYSTEMS LAB., NAT'L INST. ON STANDARDS & TECH., SECURITY ISSUES IN THE USE OF ELECTRONic DATA INTERCHANGE (1991), and sources cited therein.
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of similar fields, such as those containing part numbers, which would
otherwise not be summed. (Message integrity)
* Trusted Third-Party. The use of a third-party service provider or
value added network (VAN) to provide message status reports,
message filing and audit services, and other security services. (Originator authentication, message integrity (depending on service), nonrepudiation,confidentiality)
* Cryptographic message authentication. Techniques which utilize
message authentication codes (MAC) and "digital signatures" calculated from all bits in the message using a secret encryption key. May
be verified, if desired, by a recipient having possession of a decryption
(Originator authentication, message integrity, nonkey. 38
repudiation)
* Data encryption. Encrypts all bits of a message. Keys used for confidentiality must be different than those used for cryptographic
39
(Confidenparties must have key access.
message integrity, and both
40
tiality, non-repudiation)

These security techniques and their functions are summarized in
Table 1. Their relative strengths are not indicated in the Table. They
comprise a menu of techniques which, alone or in combination, can pro41
Each, however, has its cost in terms of
vide various levels of security.
administrative effort as well as the hardware and software needed for
its implementation. The mapping of security techniques to function is
for general guidance and is based on expected usage. For instance, access controls and message authentication techniques can provide non-repudiation if the techniques are strong and the application supports it.
38. See, e.g., FED. INFO. PROCESSING STANDARDS No. 113 (1992).
39. See FED. INFO. PROCESSING STANDARDS No. 46-1 (1992).
40. The practical and cost implications of the use of public key versus private key
cryptosystems for message authentication and data encryption are beyond the scope of
this paper.

41. See generally Model Electronic Payments Agreement and Commentary, reprinted

in EDI & INF. TECH. DIVISION, A.B.A. SEC. SCI. & TECH., MODEL ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS
AGREEMENT AND COMMENTARY, 32 JURIMET iCS J. 619, 649 (1992), which lists verification
techniques of generally ascending strength:
(a) Sequence number consistency;
(b) Comparison of control totals with Remittance Information associated with a

payment;
(c) Use and confirmation of a valid password/user ID combination;
(d) Communication call back procedures, and use of private or leased communication lines;
(e) A syntactical check on the Transaction Set as received, together with the subsequent communication of a Functional Acknowledgment to the Transaction
Set's originator;
(f) Consistency checking of the payment amount with prior transactions or customer profiles;
(g) Smart cards and 'tokens';
(h) Message Authentication Codes; and
(i) Digital Signatures.
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Conversely, cryptography without administrative controls may not provide non-repudiation.
VI. PRESUMPTIVE SECURITY LEVELS FOR VARIOUS
ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE APPLICATIONS
The security assessment associated with each EDI application
should include an examination of the substantive nature of each transaction type and an analysis of the risks and threats associated with each.
Applications range from those which are not sensitive (e.g., reports of
order status or questionnaires involving information without privacy or
business confidentiality implications), through those with low to medium levels of sensitivity (e.g., procurement transactions and regulatory
reporting), to those with high sensitivity (e.g., electronic funds transfer). The desired mix of security techniques will differ for each.
It is also important to recognize that it is the substance of the transaction rather than its form which is critical to the security analysis, as
well as to the issues associated with legal admissibility. 42 For example,
an EDI purchase order which is of relatively low dollar value and which
is part of a routine course of dealings between trading partners would
likely have a low level of risk from tampering or other threats. Likewise, it would require a relatively straightforward foundation for admissibility as evidence in the event of a dispute. On the other hand, an
identically formatted EDI purchase order which is of a high dollar value
and exchanged between parties who have never done business before
would likely have a higher level of risk from tampering or repudiation.
It would require a more extensive foundation for admissibility in
evidence.
Since this analysis focuses on the security of the data interchange
process, it does not examine a related issue relevant to admissibility:
the security of the storage of messages after receipt. One of the keys to
laying a proper evidentiary foundation is the ability to demonstrate that
an organization's recordkeeping practices are such that their outputs
can be deemed credible reflections of their inputs.43 Thus, the evidentiary showing regarding records security may also vary based on media
and storage techniques. For example, it is likely that electronic records
stored on write-once-read-many (WORM) optical media may be considered to have a higher degree of security, and hence be more readily ad42. Contrary to some popular belief, use of encrypted message authentication techniques is not necessary to satisfy legal "signature" requirements. See supra note 7. En-

cryption is but one of a number of techniques that can satisfy legal signature
requirements.
43. See JUSTICE DEP'T GUIDELINES, supra note 5.
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missible, than records stored on magnetic media. 44 The security
characteristics of an organization's data storage methods must, of
course, be considered as part of the overall security analysis:
Good electronic record systems design ensures that archives and
records retention needs are designed into the system. While such design features may be difficult to incorporate in PC-based systems, the
communications link... is an obvious and fail-safe point of capture for
maintaining a comprehensive record.... Technical means could en-

sure that nothing gets into the system without being entered in a
docket and having an archival copy made. The integrity would be
45
greater than that achievable with human- and paper-based systems.
The following schema is intended to aid in security analyses of EDI
applications. It sets forth four general categories, each with increasing
levels of security requirements, it suggests a mix of security techniques
presumptively appropriate for each level, and it provides examples of
applications which generally would be considered to be in the particular
security category.4
0 Non-Sensitive. Applications which do not involve the obligation of
federal funds and which do not have regulatory or privacy implications. Examples include order status information, material inspection
and receiving reports, and some questionnaires. For these applications,
reasonable access controls should be adequate with other techniques
being optional.
* Sensitive (Low). Applications which have no significant incentive
for tampering by third-parties. These include most small purchase
transactions, orders, invoices, bills of lading, and most regulatory reporting applications. Originator authentication and non-repudiation
can generally be satisfied by functional acknowledgments, and the risk
of tampering and privacy concerns, if any, can be minimized through
access controls. Additional authentication and non-repudiation techniques such as message repetition, internal message verification, and
imbedded references are optional.
* Sensitive (Medium). Applications which present significant incentives for tampering and/or for which a reasonable level of confidentiality should be maintained. These include responses to Invitations for
Bids and Requests for Proposals, as well as applications for valuable
benefits or substantial payments. Either of two strategies may be used.
44. Id at 50 n.2.
45. Perritt, supra note 7.
46. This category may prove controversial. On the one hand, the Computer Security

Act's definition of "sensitive" is broad, leading some to say "if it's worth keeping, it must
be sensitive." On the other hand, general principles of statutory construction suggest that
if some categories of federal data are "sensitive," others, by implication, must be non-

sensitive.
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Cryptographic data authentication 47 or similar techniques provide
strong protection against tampering. The use of message repetition acknowledgment, or other message verification techniques, in conjunction with a trusted third-party service provider may be adequate
provided that the service provider has strong system access controls
and adequate recordkeeping and audit mechanisms.
0 Sensitive (High). Applications where message confidentiality is of
particular concern, or where there is a particularly great risk from
lack of message integrity, and access related controls are deemed inadequate. These include the protection of particularly sensitive though
unclassified information such as electronic funds transfer transactions.
Generally, encryption techniques are recommended, either full text
encryption for confidentiality or cryptographic message authentication.
These sensitivity levels and their presumptive security techniques,
along with examples of each are summarized in Table 2. It should be
noted that particular transactions may have varying levels of sensitivity
for differing parameters. For example, while encryption may be considered appropriate for an electronic funds transfer, the remittance advice
information related to the transfer may have a low degree of sensitivity
for originator authentication and message integrity. Depending on the
nature of the transaction, there may or may not be confidentiality concerns. Thus, the analysis may at times be multi-dimensional.
Dealing with confidentiality concerns is particularly challenging.
On the one hand, only cryptographic techniques can ensure a high degree of confidentiality. However, in paper-based systems, the business
community has accepted that the confidentiality provided by the postal
system is adequate and that the risk of their information being improperly divulged is acceptably low. Therefore, it may be that the risk of
such disclosure on electronic networks, absent the use of encryption, is
also acceptably low. This depends on the strength of the access controls
related to the system and the type of transaction.
This may be the case since the private sector routinely transmits
confidential business information unencrypted. While it is certainly
possible for data to be intercepted while it is on a vendor's network, it is
more likely to be improperly accessed while it is still in the hands of the
company. When data spies use telecommunications networks, it is usually to gain access to a company's computers.
If parties to particular transactions think that the risk of disclosure
from unsecured telecommunications links is too high, then additional
levels of security can be added. While the installation costs of a data
encryption capability may be low, the maintenance costs (especially at
the administrative level) may be an impediment to the use of this tech47. For a description of one technique for cryptographic data authentication see FED.
INFO. PROCESSING STANDARD No. 113 (1992).
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nology, at least in the near term. Moreover, data encryption is not now
in wide use for commercial transactions other than for funds transfers.
Careful attention must be paid to the risk/cost tradeoffs in these
situations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The thesis of this paper is that evidentiary issues and security requirements are two sides of the same coin. In the realm of security,
"one size" does not fit all and just as in the law of evidence, the foundational showing will vary with the particular circumstances.
A simple hypothetical case should elucidate the point. Party A
sends Party B an electronic purchase order in a standard EDI format.
Parties Y and Z do the same. In both cases disputes arise necessitating
the use of the two purchase orders as evidence. Here, however, the similarities end. Parties A and B, it turns out, are merchants and established trading partners engaged in a regular course of business
involving the routine exchange of electronic purchase orders. The
transaction at issue involves a standard commercial product and does
not carry an extraordinary dollar value. Parties Y and Z, however, are
strangers who, although they possess and utilize EDI capability, have
never done business together before. Furthermore, the transaction was
of a high dollar value and was for the purchase of a custom manufactured item.
Although the two EDI purchase orders were essentially identical,
from an evidentiary standpoint the two transactions were totally different. The burden Party A must carry in order to have its purchase order
admitted into evidence is relatively light. The use of basic security techniques (password access control, generally reliable audit capability,
probably the use of a VAN) should suffice to have the evidence admitted. Party Y, however, must bear a heavier evidentiary burden. The
controls used by Party A might not suffice. Strong originator authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation (probably using encryption techniques) would have been advisable.
Likewise, from the standpoint of the Computer Security Act's riskbased standard, the two transactions bear little resemblance. For Parties A and B, the use of sophisticated and potentially costly security
techniques as a supplement to routine control and audit practices would
have been unnecessary to satisfy the Act. For Parties Y and Z, they
would probably have been essential.
In sum, the development of security plans as required by the Computer Security Act and good practice involves a common sense approach
to risk assessment. Analyzing the security requirements of particular
applications can be aided by considering the security characteristics
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which the application should possess as well as the sensitivity level for
each. As enhanced security techniques become more cost effective and
increasingly ubiquitous, the task will become easier. However, careful
assessment of the risk/cost tradeoffs must be made as part of this process. Attention to these factors should satisfy applicable legal
requirements.
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TABLE 1
DOCUMENT INTERCHANGE SECURITY TECHNIQUES
AND CHARACTERISTICS

CHARACTERISTICS
Originator
Message
Security Techniques Authentication Confidentiality Non-repudiation Integrity
Access Controls*
X
X
X
Imbedded
X
X
References
Functional
X
X
Acknowledgement
Message Repetition
X
X
X
Acknowledgment
Internal Message
X
Verification
Trusted Third-Party
X
X
X
X
Cryptographic Data
X
X
X
Authentication
Data Encryption
X
X
* Access controls include a variety of techniques providing a wide range of security
strength.
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TABLE 2
SECURITY SCHEMA FOR ELECTRONIC
DATA INTERCHANGE
Sensitivity Level and
Presumptive Security
Techniques
Sensitive (High)
Text Encryption per
FIPS PUB 46-1
EFT encryption
Sensitive (Medium)
Cryptographic
message
authentication
or
Message repetition
acknowledgment
through trusted
third-party
Sensitive (Low)
Access controls,
Functional
acknowledgment
Optional:
Message repetition,
Internal message
verification,
Imbedded references
Non-Sensitive
Access controls

Application
Procurement
Protection of
Logistics
Unclassified
Sensitive (PLUS)
Electronic Funds
Transfer

Examples
Non-Procurement
Regulatory and other
reporting with
particular
confidentiality concerns
Electronic Funds
Transfer

Large Purchases
(Bids and Proposals)

Regulatory and other
reporting with
significant incentive for
third-party tampering

Small Purchases
(Quotations)
Orders under
existing contracts
Invoices
Government Bills
of Lading

Regulatory and other
reporting:
tax filings
customs filings
environmental reports
Personnel actions

Bidders mailing list
information
Status of orders
Reports on orders
received
Material inspection
and receiving
reports

Questionnaires without
confidential or
proprietary information

